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ABSTRACT
At present, there is no generally accepted account of what 
philosophical counselling is or why we should practice 
it. The aim of this article is to propose an account of 
philosophical counselling in terms of an Aristotelian 
concept of Eudaimonia. I argue that this concept provides 
an apt description of what philosophical counselling, 
in many cases, consists in. One benefit of construing 
philosophical counselling in terms of Eudaimonia is that 
it provides a natural justification for the practice: since it 
is plausible that Eudaimonia is a desirable state to be in, 
philosophical counselling is worth engaging in inasmuch 
as it promotes that state.
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Introduction
Philosophical counselling is a kind of psychological therapy that 
aims to promote happiness and mental wellbeing by engaging the patient 
in broadly philosophical dialogue and inquiry. The main aim of this paper 
is to show the effectiveness of this kind of counselling when considered 
from Aristotle’s idea of Eudaimonia.
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This paper is structured as follows. In section one, I will explain 
the Aristotelian concept of Eudaimonia how such a state is achieved. 
In section two, I will show how Eudaimonia can be considered as the 
aim of philosophical counseling. Lastly in section three, I will provide 
recommendations for future studies on this topic. 
Aristotle’s concept of Eudaimonia
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by stating that “Every 
art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought 
to aim at some good”2 After pointing out that these goods are sometimes 
subordinate to others, he seems to adopt the working hypothesis that there 
is a fundamental good: a good that is intrinsically desirable (at least, for 
humans) and relative to which all other goods that we might aim at are 
subordinate, and from which they derive their meaning and value. He 
labels this ultimate good Eudaimonia and proceeds to defend a number of 
substantive claims about its nature.  According to Aristotle, the practical 
benefit derived from discussing the nature of Eudaimonia is that, like 
archers who know the nature and location of their target, we are more 
likely to achieve our goals. 
We can, perhaps, all agree that happiness or well-being is ultimately 
what is desirable in life. But in what do these states consist? Aristotle 
dismisses several candidate conceptions of happiness, as being identical 
with pleasure3, wealth4, and honor5. A more plausible account, Aristotle 
suggests, will be grounded in mankind’s distinctive nature, which gives 
rise to “the characteristic function of man.”6 He includes, quite plausibly, 
the ability to reason as part of mankind’s distinctive nature. And he also 
connects happiness to moral virtue. Eudaimonia, for Aristotle, involves 
the use of reason in accordance with the virtues. To fail to use ones reason, 
or to live without virtue, is to fail to live in the distinctively human state 
of well-being – it is to fail to do well, as a human being.
Aristotle went on to explain that moral virtue is developed through 
habituation. And for Aristotle the process of habituation is beyond mere 
imitation7 and was very similar to the psychological process called 
68   Prajñā Vihāra
reinforcement.8 This is a process by which the contents of a person’s 
character – consisting, in part, of their reflective judgements, their desires, 
and their emotional responses - is gradually modified and brought into a 
kind of internal harmony.
For example, suppose that a person decides to become kinder, 
or to learn to appreciate opera. At first, he might encounter dissonance 
between these decisions and his unconscious responses. He might still feel 
amused when he sees a stranger slip on ice, and bored at a performance 
of Don Giovanni. But, by scrutinizing these unconscious responses, and 
trying to modify how he sees their objects, over time he might come to 
feel that other people’s suffering is not funny, and that Don Giovanni 
is an entertaining and profound piece of art. Through this process he 
gains a kind of rational control over his inner life. This is something that 
humans are, perhaps, uniquely capable of. We can decide not to give in 
to temptation by resisting the second helping of cake – perhaps because 
we want to lose weight, or in order to leave enough for everybody else. 
This capacity to regulate our desires in light of our goals and values is 
essential to our status as persons For Aristotle, if we want to live well as 
a person then we have to exercise this capacity. 
Eudaimonia, then, involves the achievement of an inner harmony 
between a person’s consciously acknowledged decisions and plans, their 
desires, and their emotional responses. Philosophical counselling, I want 
to suggest, can help us overcome certain kinds of disharmony and thereby 
help bring us to Eudaimonia. I will illustrate this by considering several 
kinds of disharmony.
Eudaimonia and Philosophical Counseling
So what is philosophical counseling? A rough working definition 
of philosophical counseling extracted from the specific practices in 
South Africa9 describes philosophical counseling that includes a trained 
philosophical counselor who dealt with problems related to “reasoning 
or conceiving”, as opposed to “physiological or neuropsychiatric 
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dysfunction.” The processes used were interactive, bilateral, “dialogical”, 
and the use of mutual probing and questioning to resolve “the problem 
in question.”10
Philosophical counselors often deal with problems related to moral 
reasoning and moral dilemmas which were in line with the concept of 
Eudaimonia. Consider cases of Akrasia, or incontinence. Aristotle posed 
the question, 
“But in what sense, it may be objected, can a man judge 
rightly when he acts incontinently?”11 
In other words, how is it possible for a man to act against what 
he judges, all things considered, to be best? Yet incontinence seems an 
everyday phenomenon, involving an inner disharmony where ones’ beliefs 
and explicitly avowed values are in conflict with what one desires and 
ultimately chooses. 
The philosophical counsellor deals with such issues by guiding 
clients through their state of disharmony. She does so by asking them to 
explicitly formulate their goals, the reasons that favor them, and the sources 
of their countervailing desires. By doing this, the patient can either modify 
their goals or better understand and regulate their desires. Hopefully, this 
will result in improved happiness and mental wellbeing, and bring them 
closer to Eudaimonia. It is crucial to note that one’s explicit beliefs and 
goals do not enjoy a carte blanche in cases of akrasia: sometimes these 
need modifying, and one’s immediate emotional responses and desires 
actually better represent ones character. This is the lesson to take form 
the literature on inverse akrasia. For instance, in ethical studies of Mark 
Twain’s work Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Bennett. considers the 
kind of emotional distress felt by Huck Finn concerning the conflicts of 
his moral beliefs.12 Huck considered his attempts to help the escaped slave 
Jim. as morally wrong from the standpoint of social beliefs. And yet this 
deeper sense of morality and loyalty to Jim was what was truly right. 
This would be one of the purposes of philosophical counseling: to make 
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one see the rightness or wrongness of ones internalized moral beliefs.
Scenario 1: Political Decision Making 
Mr. A who is a newly elected member of parliament comes in for 
counseling. His problem is, he must vote for a race-based matriculation 
system bill that is going to be tabled in parliament by the ruling party of 
his country. Now, the political whip of his party had already forewarned 
all party MPs that they must show collective political support by giving 
their affirmative vote regardless of their personal feelings. This is to show 
political solidarity with the ruling party which will ensure the votes from 
the majority ethnic group in the next general election. Personally, he does 
not approve of racial discriminations as his moral beliefs is in the values 
of meritocracy. Though he and his family would benefit by his affirmative 
vote as they are from the majority ethnic group, he still cannot support 
such a bill. But he knows that if he doesn’t cast his affirmative vote then 
he will be losing favor with his political party and its leadership. That 
would put his political career into jeopardy. At home, his wife thinks 
that he should cast his affirmative vote, as they as family would benefit 
economically. This creates an inner conflict (moral dilemmas) between 
his moral beliefs and values and what is expected of him resulting in 
unhappiness, stress and mentally strained. How can I help Mr. A through 
philosophical counseling? Here is a proposed approach.
As a philosophical counselor, I am merely a moderator who is 
there to guide Mr. A to bring about inner harmony by synchronizing his 
moral beliefs and values with his political decision making and actions 
that would bring inner moral harmony of his inner conflicts. So I would 
begin by asking him to assert what his beliefs and values for the purpose 
of vocalizing and reinforcing what he already holds and what he wants 
for the future. questions like, “What is your considered moral belief about 
the affirmative vote that is expected of you.” or, “Since it is expected 
of you to give an affirmative vote, what would you really like to do?” 
If he insist upon his moral beliefs and values and resists is against the 
affirmative vote, then I will raise his fears of the possibility of his political 
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career loss and the blame that might come from his wife for not doing 
what was expected of him The purpose of raising such fears is to prepare 
him to face his fears even before it happens, and to assist him with the 
necessary justifications for his eventual decisions and actions. So I will 
ask, “Since you already know the expectations of your party and your wife, 
do you agree with them?” If he says, “no” then I will ask him what your 
justifications are for saying no to them. I will then assist him to think and 
write down all possible justifications he can use to support his rejection 
of the affirmative vote. But at the same time I would again remind him 
that there are realistic consequences of career loss and blame from his 
wife that might result. I will then assist him to think and prepare for such 
results. The counseling principle is to assist the client to understand his 
own justifications for his own decisions and actions, as was the case of the 
Huck Finn example. And at the same time to prepare him to have his own 
contingency plans to face the consequences of his decisions and actions. 
If Mr. A has both his own justifications and his own contingency plans, 
he can then proceed and act in accordance to his deeper moral beliefs and 
values thereby bringing inner moral harmony that leads to happiness, and 
mentally wellbeing. Overall, it would lead Mr. A closer to Eudaimonia.
On the other hand, if his response is, “Well! It is better I do what 
my party and wife expects and avoid the negative consequences,” I will 
counter and ask him the following questions. Firstly, “how will you justify 
your response that is in contradiction to your moral beliefs and values.” 
Secondly, “How can you justify decision to the minority constituents 
who also voted for you?” Thirdly, “what will you do if there is a public 
backlash against your party and you for racial discrimination?” Fourthly, 
“are you ready to lose your personal moral credibility to do what is merely 
expected of you?” Now, the above questions are meant to counter Mr. 
A’s rationalization that disregard his deeper moral reasoning. It is to alert 
him to long-term moral distress and moral residue of such a decision. 
The counseling principle is to work with his original desire for inner 
moral harmony and his desire to attend counseling in order to resolve 
his moral conflicts and lead him closer to Eudaimonia. The next case 
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study I would like to discuss involves a tragic moral dilemma in medical 
decision making.
Scenario 2: Medical Decision Making
Ms. J who works as an emergency room doctor in a local hospital 
comes for counseling. She recently underwent the traumatic experience 
of having to decide to save a mother’s life over the life of her child who 
were accident victims. She is suffering from moral distress and carries 
with her moral guilt after making a life and death decision. What makes 
her moral guilt unavoidable was whichever person she decides to save, 
she would lose the other. How can I help Ms. J through philosophical 
counseling? Here is a proposed approach.
I would begin by asking her to recount and relive her experience. 
The purpose is to journey with her through traumatic experience in a 
supportive but objective manner so that she can reflect on her decision 
making, her present feelings, her responsibilities and accountability. It is 
also to assist her to overcome her ‘moral residue’ of guilt. As she recounts 
her experience, I will ask her probing questions. I would begin by asking, 
“On the day of case, how you were physically, emotionally and mentally 
feeling?” This question was to establish her prior physical, emotional and 
mental states. The reason being her state of being would directly affect her 
decision makings. I would probe about her professional views concerning 
dealing with patients. This is to remind her of her professionalism. Based 
on her diagnosis, it is obvious that both mother and child were in danger 
based on the fact that she decided to save the mother rather than her child. 
I would then probe her justifications of why she chose the mother’s live 
over the child. This is to ascertain whether she had an option to save 
both mother and child. Again, in this case scenario, she did not have that 
option judging by her choice to save the mother. Next, I will ask her, “If 
in your professional assessment you decided to save the mother because 
you assessed that medically she had the best chance of survival, why do 
you feel guilty? Are you having doubts that both patients could have been 
saved?” This is to ascertain whether her feelings of guilt were due to her 
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doubts in her medical assessment. If she has no doubts in her professional 
medical decision, then it is clear that her feelings the preciousness of life 
are overwhelming her correct medical decision.
Finally, I would then ask a rhetorical question, “Are not glad that 
you managed to save the mother’s life?” Though her answer of “yes” 
was expected it was deliberately asked to highlight the fact that she was 
successful in saving a life thereby cementing her belief in the value of the 
preciousness of life. By this strategy, I would able to guide Ms. J to regain 
her inner harmony by dispelling her moral guilt and to have resilience 
for future similar traumatic experiences
   
Conclusion and Recommendations
The above scenarios dealt with moral reasoning and moral 
dilemmas and which created various states of inner disharmony. 
Eudaimonia therefore became useful as an end goal in philosophical 
counseling which attempts to resolve these issues. The key is to understand 
ones deeper moral reason and find ways of justifying it in the face of more 
superficial circumstances like the expectations of society or family, or 
professional expectations. Especially important is the idea that morality is 
something habitual, something which needs to be practices. Philosophical 
counseling can resolve conflicts and train one to cultivate one’s inner 
virtue. Aristotle’s concept of Eudaimonia. continues to be an important 
guide in resolving mental conflicts among patients. My recommendations 
for the future based on this study are:
1. There be more philosophical counseling studies based on the 
psychological concepts found in the Nicomachean Ethics.
2. There be more researches done on the correlation between 
moral reasoning and erroneous thinking.
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